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Contrary to the incommensurability thesis, I argue that the referents of 
theoretical terms can remain stable under theory change, if they are 
associated with “sparse meaning spaces.” In them, reference is error 
tolerant, for there are no alternatives in the neighborhood to which terms 
in altered descriptions can shift their reference.  
1.	  Introduction	  
 Professor Norsen has written a fine study of the historical changes in the concept of 
temperature. It is distinctive for the care with which he has traced what is truly essential in the 
historical development of the theoretical notion of temperature. Although the evolution of the 
                                                
1 My thanks for helpful discussion to Travis Norsen, P. D. Magnus and participants in the 
Workshop on Concepts, Induction, and the Growth of Knowledge, Pittsburgh, September 17, 
2010. 
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concept of temperature is a long and tangled story, Professor Norsen keeps his focus 
commendably on just those parts needed for the philosophical work he wishes to undertake. 
 In this regard, a major goal of Professor Norsen’s analysis is to refute a claim by earlier 
writers like Kuhn and, more explicitly, Feyerabend, on the meaning of terms like temperature. 
Feyerabend points out that the background assumptions change when we move from a purely 
thermodynamic analysis of temperature to a statistical one. In the first, heat only passes from hot 
to cold. In the second, when statistical fluctuations arise, heat can also pass from cold to hot, in 
violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Therefore, Feyerabend concludes, the two 
terms cannot have the same meaning. A lot is at stake with this claim. It has been taken in the 
wider literature to underwrite a further claim of the incommensurability of theories under theory 
change. 
 Exactly how we are to understand “meaning” in this claim is not entirely clear. If we are 
to get some purchase on Feyerabend’s claim, we need some characterization what meaning is. In 
the following, I will take the meaning of a term to be its semantic content—that to which it 
refers. As a result, meaning and reference will come out to be the same thing. There will be 
many possibilities for the meanings, the referents, of some particular term and, at this stage, I am 
leaving open just what sorts of things they may be. They may be abstract entities like sets; or 
possible physical states; or actual physical states. Whatever they may be, in each case there will, 
in general, be multiple possibilities for the meaning of particular term. These possibilities form a 
space of meanings. One identifies the meaning of a term by identifying the map from the term to 
some particular meaning in this space.   
 Professor Norsen dissents from Feyerabend’s analysis and urges what I believe is the 
correct conclusion. A term can retain its meaning when background assumptions change. My 
remarks here will serve only to sharpen the problem he addresses and explain why I think his 
conclusion is correct. In particular, I will seek to diagnose why our philosophical community is 
divided by the question. Some readily agree with Feyerabend that changing background 
assumptions alters meaning; others do not. I will conclude that the two groups are divided by 
their assumptions about the character of the spaces possible meanings can form. The first group 
assumes a dense meaning space so that small changes in background assumptions enable a term 
to attach to a new meaning. The second group assumes a sparse meaning space, so that there are 
no nearby meanings to which a term might attach, when there are changes in background 
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assumptions. This affords some stability of meaning, since small errors in description can be 
discounted and even corrected. 
2.	  Energy	  as	  a	  Surrogate	  for	  Temperature	  
 Before proceeding to this analysis, I will provide a version of Feyerabend’s objection that 
enables us to see a little more clearly how differences in background theory might disrupt 
reference.2 Ordinary thermodynamics tells us that the energy E of some sample of an ideal gas at 
temperature T is related to the amount of the gas, measured by n, the number of moles of gas, 
and the temperature T as: 
E is proportional to n.T 
This relationship holds no matter how small the sample of gas. This means that we can use the 
energy E as a surrogate for temperature. It is true for n=1, a single mole of gas, such as 2 grams 
of hydrogen. It is true when n gets to be very small, even when n is of the order of 10-25. 
 This relation no longer holds exactly in statistical mechanics. The energy of a quantity of 
an ideal gas will fluctuate slightly as its molecules lose or gain energy in exchanges with the 
thermal environment. For one mole of a gas, the fluctuations are an imperceptible fraction of the 
total energy. It is not so for 10-23 mole, for we now typically have only one or so molecules 
present. The energy of each of those molecules will vary with time and will be distributed 
probabilistically over a wide range of energies. While the average, the expected energy, will 
continue to conform to the above formula, the energy E of the sample will at any moment be 
very different from the expectation value. Hence the energy E of a tiny sample at any moment 
will be a poor surrogate for its temperature.  
 This failure of surrogacy of energy for temperature can disrupt reference. In ordinary 
thermodynamics, doubling the energy of a small sample of an ideal gas refers to a process in 
which the temperature doubles. In statistical physics, the doubling of the energy of a sample of 
                                                
2 The idea that fluctuations automatically produce violations of the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics is one that is easy to believe. However the proposal is the starting point of a 
ponderous literature on Maxwell’s Demon that seeks to establish that the violation cannot be 
secured. Our present purpose does not require us get embroiled in this mess. 
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ideal gas might merely refer to a thermal fluctuation in the energy of the few molecules 
comprising the sample, while the temperature remains constant. 
3.	  Two	  Cases	  
 Does the temperature of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics have the same 
meaning in the two theories, in spite of these differences? Since I am construing meaning as 
reference, one might seek to answer this question by calling up theories of reference already in 
the philosophical literature. I do not think, however, that these theories alone can decide the 
question. However, we can see how the question can be decided by looking at two extreme cases 
of unstable and stable reference. They happen to coincide with motivating examples from 
descriptivist and causal theories of reference, respectively. But that does not mean that we must 
attach instability of reference to the descriptivist theory and stability to causal theory. For present 
purposes, that can be left as an open question. 
4.1	  Mathematical	  Functions	  
 First, consider the case of functions in mathematics. Take the function y = f(x) that passes 
through the origin (x,y) = (0,0) with unit slope and: 
has everywhere zero second derivative; or 
has a second derivative equal to itself, negated. 
The first is just the linear function y = x. The second is a sine function, y = sin x. These are 
contradictory descriptions. A function on numbers is simply a set of ordered pairs of numbers. 
Plainly, the two descriptions refer to different sets. That difference stems directly from the fact 
that the two descriptions ascribe contradictory properties to the function. Setting aside familiar 
philosopher’s tricks,3 this will generally be the case; if the descriptions of functions contradict, 
then they do not refer to the same function. In this case, this difference of referents does not arise 
                                                
3 By “philosopher’s tricks,” I mean maneuvers like taking two compatible descriptions and 
rendering them contradictory by appending irrelevant but contradictory statements. For example, 
logically compatible definitions D1 and D2 are made contradictory by taking any contingent 
proposition X and forming new definitions D1&X and D2&(not-X). 
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from confusing the description with the referent. There are very many different, logically 
compatible descriptions one can give that refer to the same function.4 
 The case of the linear and sine functions has been chosen to mimic an important feature 
of the relationship of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. These two theories agree 
arbitrarily closely when we look at large samples of matter over short times. While energy E is a 
surrogate for temperature T in the ideal gases of thermodynamics, it is not a perfect surrogate in 
the statistical analysis of ideal gases. It fails completely for very small samples of an ideal gas, 
but comes closer and closer to surrogacy as we consider larger samples. 
 One might want to say that the approach to agreement is enough to establish that the term 
temperature in the two cases has the same meaning. Arbitrarily small differences eventually just 
do not matter to reference. However, if one takes the case of mathematical functions as one’s 
model, that conclusion is blocked. Differences, no matter how small, always matter. By 
considering smaller and smaller neighborhoods around the origin y=x=0, one can bring the linear 
and sine functions arbitrarily close to one another. However, no matter how close they come in 
these smaller neighborhoods, they can never come close enough to be the same. The two 
functions are different over any domain, no matter how small, excepting the trivial domain with 
one point, x=0.5 
 If the case of temperature is like that of functional descriptions, then it does not matter 
how closely the thermodynamic and statistical properties of temperature approach in selected 
domains. They are always referring to different things. 
4.2	  Proper	  Names	  
 Matters go very differently with the referents of proper names, the motivating case for  
Kripke and Putnam’s causal theory of reference. It is a familiar occurrence that contradictory 
descriptions of entities with proper names can have the same referent. Here’s a simple example. 
The city that we otherwise know as Jerusalem is described variously as: 
“the city in which the Temple was built” by Jews; 
                                                
4 I think this one also works for the linear function y=x: that strictly increasing function that is its 
own inverse. 
5 This sole point of agreement is eliminated by considering functions over domains with x>0. 
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“the city in which Jesus, son of God, was crucified” by Christians; and 
 “the city from which Mohammed, God’s true prophet, ascended to heaven” by Muslims. 
Each of the three religious groups harbor contradictory background assumptions. While the 
contradictions are not immediately apparent, they are there. Christians, for example, would 
contradict the Muslim’s description of Mohammed; and Muslims would return the favor with 
Jesus. Yet they all refer to the same city. 
 If temperature is like these proper names, then the term can still refer to the same thing, 
even though the term may appear in two different theories, thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics, with contradictory background assumptions. 
5.	  Error	  Tolerance	  
 Which of the two cases is temperature like? Prima facie, temperature is unlike a proper 
name. The latter denotes a particular thing that can be picked out by ostension. Temperature 
denotes a theoretical property of equilibrium thermal systems; and it cannot be picked out by 
ostension. Merely pointing to a hot oven, no matter how artfully, falls far short. Temperature can 
only be picked out by engaging in a theoretical discourse. One might point to the level of 
Mercury in a thermometer and then explain the theory that assures us that it measures the 
property, temperature, defined within the theory. In this regard, temperature is akin to the 
description of functions; in both cases, the theoretical background in which the terms appear is 
essential for determining to what they refer. 
 While temperature is akin in this regard to mathematical functions, that similarity is not 
the one that decides the stability or instability of the meaning of the term. What decides stability 
is the extent of error tolerance in the specification of meaning. The crucial difference between 
the two cases of mathematical functions and proper names lies in this: 
• The definition of mathematical functions is highly intolerant of errors. The slightest change 
in the definition can lead it to pick out a different function (or none at all if the new 
definition is self-contradictory). We cannot refer to the linear function by describing a 
function, whose second derivative is everywhere zero, except in the interval 101<x<113, 
where is it something else. That is just a description of a different function. 
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• The designation of the referents of proper name terms exhibits far greater tolerance for 
error. One can have contradictory descriptions, so that at least one and possibly both 
descriptions are erroneous. However they can both still refer to the same thing. Christians 
and Muslims disagree on many facts about Jesus and Mohammed, so that at least one is 
error-ridden. Yet, they agree on enough of the use of maps to locate the city in which the 
two died and to determine that they are referring to the same place. 
6.	  Density	  and	  Sparseness	  of	  Meaning	  Spaces	  
 What matters to stability or instability of reference is error tolerance. This tolerance 
derives from the structure of the space of meanings. In the case of mathematical functions, the 
referent of terms like the linear function and sine function is a set of ordered pairs. The space of 
all such sets form the space of meanings of function terms. This space is dense in that the 
slightest change in a definition of a function can reattach the function name to a different set of 
ordered pairs. There is such a richness of possibilities that any error in the description of a 
function is likely to issue in a changed meaning. 
 One might think of throwing a dart at a dartboard. The slightest change in the throw will 
lead the dart to hit a different point on the board, which is dense in points. 
 In the case of proper names, the meaning space is a sparse set. In the case of cities, there 
are no competitors for major cities in the space that might be just like Jerusalem in almost all 
aspects. As a result, when Christians and Muslims make contradictory claims about the city, the 
reference is unaffected. In principle, reading uncharitably, each might say of the other that they 
have specified no city at all when their descriptions make false claims of the intended city. In 
practice, however, we select out enough of the facts upon which the two agree to see that they 
each have the same referent. 
 The situation is more like the game of quoits. In it, ring-like hoops are thrown over an 
upright peg. To score, one need not throw the quoit so its exact center falls on the peg. Any 
throw that places the peg somewhere in the interior of the quoit succeeds. Slight errors in tosses 
do not compromise scoring. 
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7.	  The	  Stability	  and	  Instability	  of	  Meaning	  of	  Temperature	  
 What is the meaning space of terms like temperature? Here one’s prior assumptions about 
the world are decisive. Is one a realist or a constructivist? 
7.1	  Stability	  for	  Realists	  
 If one has realist inclinations as Travis Norsen and I do, we are seeking to attach terms like 
temperature to things in the world. Precisely how the attachment goes is an issue for analysis 
elsewhere. We might attach temperature to a property of things; or we might conceive of 
properties extensionally: temperature partitions things in the world into equivalence classes of 
things at the same temperature; and these equivalence classes admit a transitive numerical 
ordering. 
 Under this realist view, the space of meanings is sparse. There are other properties in the 
world that divide things up in superficially similar ways. Among the familiar ones, the properties 
of mass or volume or average density divide things into equivalence classes that also admit 
transitive numerical orderings. However these other properties are unlike temperature in so many 
ways that quite radical changes would be needed in a theory of temperature before the referent of 
the term could come out as mass, for example. 
 This sparseness provides a great degree of error tolerance. All the facts mentioning 
temperature in ordinary thermodynamics cannot be true of the temperature of a world in which 
statistical mechanics gives the correct account. Thermodynamics and statistical physics will 
disagree markedly on some facts in the realm of the very small, such as whether energy is an 
exact surrogate for the temperature of ideal gases. However they will agree closely enough on 
macroscopic systems for us to discount the errors of thermodynamics. If its term “temperature” 
refers at all, we can recognize that it refers to the same thing as the term does in statistical 
mechanics. There is no other candidate in the meaning space in the vicinity. Thermodynamics 
errs, however, in some of the facts it ascribes to temperature. However these errors are not 
sufficiently great to force the terms of the two theories to have different referents. 
 Error tolerance is not unlimited for realists even with sparse meaning spaces. It fails, for 
example, in the case of the term “Mercury,” as it might be used by a modern chemist and by the 
alchemist, Paracelsus. Superficially their referents may seem to agree on the familiar liquid metal 
we find in modern thermometers. However the divergence of referents become clear when we 
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realize that a surrogate for Mercury for Paracelsus is that it is one of the three basic principles 
that form all substances; and it is the one whose presence gives materials their fusibility and 
volatility. Paracelsus would likely not allow that the modern chemist’s pure sample of Mercury 
is a pure instance of his Mercuric principle. From the perspective of modern chemistry, 
Paracelsus’ use of the term goes beyond the limits of error tolerance. He is trying to refer to 
something that does not exist. 
7.2	  Instability	  for	  Constructivists	  
 Matters can turn out differently if one is not a realist. One might adopt a constructivist 
position and assert that theoretical descriptions create their referents. One might say, for 
example, that the space of meanings is created by the theories as abstract entities, in the way that 
functional descriptions attach to the abstract entities, sets of ordered pairs. Such a space could 
conceivably be so dense that the slightest change in the description of a term in a theory may 
create a different referent. That circumstance would be compatible with Feyerabend’s claim that 
a change in background assumptions generates a change in meaning.  
 In sum, then, whether one arrives at a conclusion of stability or instability of meaning 
derives from ones prior assumptions concerning issues like realism or constructivism. This 
means that the assertion by either group of stability or instability of meaning cannot be used to 
mount further arguments for realism or constructivism, on pain of circularity. Finally, if 
instability of meaning is sufficient to establish the incommensurability of theories, then this 
pathway to incommensurability is open only for constructivists. Realists need not be troubled by 
it. 
8.	  Twin	  Earth:	  An	  Illustration	  of	  Sparseness	  
 As closing illustration, the notion of sparseness of the meaning space helps explain the 
bewilderment felt by many including me when we are shown Putnam’s celebrated “Twin Earth” 
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thought experiment.6 We are to image a twin of our earth on which everything appears just as on 
our earth. There is a substance that has all the appearance of water in ordinary circumstances, but 
it is not H20. It is, Putnam tells us, “a different liquid whose formula is very long and 
complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ.” and that on Twin Earth the 
word “water” means XYZ. For anyone with even a meager background in chemistry, it is 
unimaginable that there could be such a substance. The quantum theory underpinning chemistry 
only admits a small roster of elements and the readily determinable physical, chemical, thermal 
and electrical properties of water are so extensive as to admit no other chemical combination 
than H20. To state this another way, the meaning space for liquids invoked by the thought 
experiment is sparse and the only referents to which the liquid of Earth and Twin Earth could 
attach is H20. The thought experiment collapses into a fantasy so remote from reality that we 
should despair of using it to discern how reference works in the real world. 
 
 
                                                
6 I thank Jim Woodward for suggesting this application. See Hilary Putnam, “The meaning of 
'meaning” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2: Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. Ch. 12. 
